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Slavic Review the nationalist discourse of interwar Poland and can be conveniently summed up in the word Zydokomuna (Judeo-communism) -the idea that Jews above all other minorities were (and are) the main supporters of communism at the mass level and that communism was primarily a vehicle of a broaderJewish conspiracy to seize power.10 While acknowledging the appeal of the Communist Party to Jews, other scholars have maintained that the communists in Poland picked up support among other minority groups, especially the Belarusans and to a lesser extent the Ukrainians, throughout the 1920s.11 Burks himself notes the statistical relationship between the size of the Jewish population and support for the communists but also points to the correlation between the percentage of Belarusans and Ukrainians in a given area and the communist vote.12 Unfortunately Burks's analysis, though pathbreaking for its day, suffers from what in retrospect are serious methodological flaws. First, Burks never "translates" the correlations between the presence of an ethnic group and communist voting into actual votes for the communists. This is important, because even if the presence of an ethnic minority and the communist vote were perfectly correlated, there would not necessarily have to be a one-to-one correspondence across districts between the number of minorities and the number of communist votes. There is no simple way to "read off" from a correlation coefficient how communist support across districts varies with the presence of a given ethnic minority.
The second and more serious problem with the analysis is the mismatch between the types of inferences Burks wants to make concerning the propensity of minorities to support communist parties and the statistical methods he employs. Burks collected aggregate data on the number of minorities and the number of votes parties received across regions and seeks to estimate the unobserved propensity of individual minority voters to support particular parties. He notes the high correlation across regions between the density of national minorities and the popularity of communist parties and concludes that the minorities must have been voting communist. Unfortunately such a conclusion is unwarranted. That national minorities tend to cluster in areas of high communist support does not imply that individual minority voters supported the communists. Burks committed what is known as the "ecological fallacy."
Fortunately there are now better tools for performing such an analysis. We employ the ecological inference model (hereafter, EI) described by Gary King to estimate who voted for whom in the 1922 and 1928 Polish national parliamentary elections.13 The goal is to estimate the percentage of a given social group that supported a given party or bloc of parties using only census data on social group membership and electoral data 
Census and Election in 1920s Poland
Interwar Poland reemerged from the lands of three defunct empires: the Habsburg, the German, and the Russian.17 This had two major effects on the functioning and makeup of the new state. The first concerned ethnic Poles themselves. Since Poles had lived for over a century under three very different forms of rule, it was only natural that the political parties and political cultures that emerged would be highly heterogeneous. The Polish authorities themselves understood this and in constructing national statistics not only divided up the country into provinces but also categorized these provinces as western (the former German territories), central (the areas of former Congress Poland), eastern (lands from the Russian empire), or southern (territory from the Habsburg empire). They understood that forging a sense of national unity from among such highly disparate lands, even among ethnic Poles, would not be an easy task. Following the pathbreaking work ofJerzy Tomaszewski, we use data on religion (except for Germans, where the census results were, for the most part, accurate) to infer ethnic composition.22 This inference is justified on a number of grounds. First, contemporary observers noted that census takers reported religious affiliation; these results were not falsified at upper levels.23 Second, ethnic groups in interwar Poland correspond fairly closely to religious affiliation. Poles tended to be Catholic,Jews tended to be of the Jewish faith, Ukrainians in eastern Galicia were overwhelmingly Uniates (Greek Catholic), and Belarusans were almost entirely Orthodox. In a handful of districts, especially in Volhynia, two districts of Polesia, and several districts surrounding Chelm where a significant number of Orthodox Ukrainians resided, there remained difficulties using religion to infer ethnicity. Fortunately these communities are easily identifiable from the census data because the districts in question are the only ones where the Orthodox inhabitants far outnumber the Belarusans. It is important to remember that the data on nationality are provided not to present an accurate reflection of the numbers of Ukrainians and Belarusans in a given district (which they do not) but to show that Ukrainians and Belarusans did not generally live side by side and can therefore be separated for analytical purposes even when data on religion are used to infer ethnicity.
In addition, a small or moderate number of Catholic Ukrainians, Catholic Belarusans, Orthodox Poles, Orthodox Russians, and Catholic Lithuanians will remain miscategorized.24 But the numbers here are relatively small and our units are large enough so that, again following Tomaszewski, the anomalies tend to cancel each other out (that is, the number of Catholic Ukrainians in a district is roughly equal to the number of Orthodox Poles). As a final check, we also use data compiled by Polish au- The 1922 election took place before the eastern borders of the country were settled in the minds of many Ukrainians and while the question of Upper Silesia remained open.26 The electoral system, based on a modified system of proportional representation, made it relatively easy for small, regional parties to gain entry to the lower house, the Sejm. As a consequence, many different ethnic and regional parties contested the election. At least four ethnic Ukrainian parties and seven ethnicJewish parties competed, and these were complemented by a plethora of regional, classbased, and multiethnic parties. Because there were so many parties, and many of these had ideologically similar profiles, we simplify the analysis by grouping parties into blocs. In the south and east there is far more heterogeneity. The lower and more to the right a district appears in a given panel, the more the minorities in that district supported parties other than ethnic ones. In the east the principal competitor for the ethnic vote appears to have been the left. In highly ethnic areas where ethnic parties performed relatively poorly, such as Baranowice, Drohiczyn, Luniniec, Pinisk, and Pruiana, leftist parties received 59 percent or more of the vote. This is one piece of evidence that some of the Orthodox, who were concentrated in the east, were already gravitating toward leftist parties. In the south it was primarily the center and less so the right-wing parties causing the "dip" in minority party support in mixed districts (between approximately 50 percent and 85 percent minority). The left held little allure either for the Ukrainians, who comprised the most important ethnic group in this region, or for the Poles.
The panels in figure 1 are highly suggestive, yet they do not give us a complete picture of partisan divisions within the electorate in 1922. We present our EI estimates of the social sources of all blocs' electoral support below in table 2. Each column identifies a major party or bloc of parties. Each row identifies a major social group. The numbers in the table represent the estimated percentage of the voters of a given social group that vote for a party or bloc. Thus, for example, we estimate that 65 percent of the Jews (that voted) supported minority parties, 2 percent supported center parties, and 18 percent voted for nonrevolutionary leftist parties.
Like all statistical estimates, these have errors associated with them. Specifically, there are two types of errors. The first is the conventional error resulting from having only a finite number of observations. We report the standard errors associated with each estimate in parentheses. The second source of error arises from our particular estimation method. In principle the percentages in each row should add up to 100 percent. For example, if 65 percent of the Jews supported minority parties, then 35 percent must have supported other parties. The proportions of a social group's vote are like pieces of a pie-they must ultimately add up to one. A cursory glance at this table reveals that none of the row percentages sum to 100 percent. Part of the problem is that the blocs presented in this table do not include all the parties that obtained votes. Some parties could not be categorized properly or only contested certain areas. More important, however, we obtained each estimate independently of every other. For example, we estimated Orthodox support for the nonrevolutionary left without taking into account that 76 percent of the Orthodox were already estimated to be voting for other blocs. Thus, there was no statistical constraint on the estimated values, yielding row marginals that could be above or below 100 percent. We leave the joint estimation of all quantities as a 98 Slavic Review Table 2 28. Jews and Catholics dwelled throughout interwar Poland, so the estimates for these groups were computed using the full database wherever possible. In some cases, due to lack of data, western districts are excluded. The Ukrainian estimates are based on Galician districts, and the Orthodox on eastern, or eastern and central districts, depending on the availability of observations and the stability of the estimates. In no case were there significant discrepancies between estimates derived just from eastern districts and those attained by combining eastern and central districts. We compensated for the Ukrainian boycott of the 1922 election by using EI to estimate the turnout rate among Ukrainians for each district and by weighting the census data by the estimated turnout. The estimates of minority support for the Right were obtained using the proportion of the district population that was Catholic as a covariate. The biggest surprise is the political behavior of the Jews. As we mentioned in the introduction, there is a myth in Poland that, more than any other minority, theJews were (and are) the bulwarks of communism at the mass level, and that even if not all Jews were communists, at least all communists were probablyJews. We hope the data in table 3 can put to rest the claim that the Jews were the major supporters of the communists.
